Substantial Assistance and Sentence Severity: Is There a Correlation?
ow much more severe are sentences imposed in districts with low substantial assistance rates than those in which the rate is very high? In the aggregate, not at all.
At first blush this may puzzle readers because substantial assistance (SA) departures are very unevenly distributed across districts and SA accounts for nearly two-thirds of all downward departures, almost 7,900 of the 12,000 in fiscal 1996.' Although this pattern could result in gross disparities among districts, my analysis of interdistrict sentencing patterns reveals no statistically significant correlation between the rate of SA departures and the average length of sentences imposed in a district.
A high rate of SA does not mean that sentences are generally more lenient because SA departures are only one factor in the complex system that determines sentence severity. SA departures are among the most visible mechanisms, but their impact is typically blunted by district-specific practices in which prosecutors and judges respond to each other's choices in ways that even out interdistrict differences and mitigate the disparities that might otherwise result from wide variation in SA departures.' I. Disparity Substantial assistance departures vary greatly among districts. There is an almost fivefold difference in cooperation rates between the ten highest and ten lowest districts. The average cooperation rate for the ten lowest districts is 7.1%.3 The average cooperation rate for the ten highest districts is 38.I%.4 Defendants in the io lowest SA districts had about one-fifth the chance of receiving a substantial assistance downward departure at the time of sentence 5 compared to defendants 6 in the io highest SA districts. There are also 37 districts in the middle, whose rates fall in a band between 15% and 25%. Despite these variations, Commission statistics for all 94 districts in FY 1996 show no significant correlation between a district's substantial assistance rate and the average lengths of all sentences of imprisonment or the average lengths of narcotics trafficking sentences in a given district. The District of Connecticut had an overall SA rate of io.9%, including a SA rate of 19.2% for narcotics trafficking (15 out of 78 cases). Neighboring Vermont had an overall SA departure rate of 25.8%, including a SA rate of 45.5% in narcotics cases (i 5 out of 33 cases). Again, the lower rate went with the longer sentence. Connecticut's SA rate is higher than Rhode Island's, yet its mean sentence is much longer, 104.8 months.
The First Circuit thus contains combinations of SA rates and sentence lengths that are very disparate
III. Comparing Same-State Districts
Districts within the same state also show significant variations. The Northern District of Mississippi had an overall SA rate of29.4% (45 out of i3 cases) with half the narcotics defendants receiving SA departures (30 out of 6o cases). The Southern District of Mississippi had an overall rate of16.3%. In this district, 36.6% of the narcotics trafficking defendants received SA departures (26 out of 7Icases), but those 26 were almost 8o% of all the departures (26 out of 33 cases). Despite these differences, the mean narcotics trafficking sentence was nearly the same: in the Southern District of Mississippi the mean was 101.7 months, while in the Northern District it was 104.6 months.
Illinois has three districts, ranging from a low of 13.4% for the Southern District, to 18.8% for the Northern District, to a high of 32.7% for the Central District. In this trio, the district with the lowest SA rate had the middle length narcotics trafficking sentence. The Southern District reported a mean narcotics sentence of 1O9.5 months, the high SA rate Central District was not far behind with a mean of 98 months, and the Northern District, with its 18.8% SA departures, reported a mean sentence of 119.7 months.
Variations are also found in the West. In Washington, the Eastern District had a substantial assistance departure rate of 4.5% (9 out of 202 cases), while the Western District had a rate of 22% (97 out of 440 cases), but their mean narcotics sentence lengths were almost identical. The Eastern District had 68.3 months and the Western District had 68.4 months.
In these three sets of same-state districts, the SA rates varied considerably but average sentence lengths fell within a narrow range. All these districts could be compared in other ways but they illustrate that quite different combinations of high or low SA rates and relatively severe or lenient sentences can be found in contiguous districts.
IV. Alternative Ways to Mitigate Sentences
Several different mechanisms permit sentence severity to remain independent of the single most common mitigating guideline factor. Perhaps the easiest mechanism to identify in these data is the nationwide tendency of districts to mitigate sentences with either SA departures or other downward judicial departures (judicial departures), but not both.' When judges are generous with mitigation through judicial departures, prosecutors scale back; when prosecutors are free with SA departures, judges make less use of the discretion to mitigate by using factors other than SA." I This pattern mitigates some of the sentencing disparity that would otherwise flow from wide variations in SA rates because judges seem to be balancing prosecutorial use of SA departures with judicial departures.
Comparison of SA downward departures and judicial departures also illustrates the complexity of the system. Unlike SA departures, rates of judicial departures do correlate with lower overall sentences and lower narcotics sentences." The use of judicial departures probably correlates with sentence severity because other downward departures are often not the subject of bargaining between the defendant and the prosecutor, leaving judges with much greater control. When the award and magnitude of a departure is entirely up to the judge, whose intentions remain unknown until the prosecutor has made all of his or her charging and sentencing decisions, the mitigation "goes right to the bottom line" in the sense that it reduces the sentence without any opportunity for responsive moves by the prosecutor. Thus, judicial departures are more likely to represent a judicial judgment that sentence mitigation is warranted in a given case, rather than a judgment that a particular sentence is warfanted because of the prosecutor's SA motion or charging decision.
Judicial sentencing attitudes play out in a more complicated fashion in the arena of SA downward departures. Clearly a judge's own views play the key role in those cooperation sentences where the magnitude of the departure is completely in the judge's discretion.
3 But because SA downward departures are always the result of bargaining between the defendant and the prosecutor, the magnitude of SA departures can be limited. For instance, prosecutors may agree to move for a departure below the applicable guideline range but not below the mandatory minimum. 4 Defendants who receive departures in some high SA districts may find the benefit lower than average because the government chooses to tie its generous SA departure policy with less generous recommendations as to the magnitude of the SA departure.
5
Controlling the magnitude of departures granted by judges, however, is the more visible but probably the smaller part of the process that tends to even out the sentence impact of inter-district variations in SA departure rates. Other exercises of prosecutorial discretion, besides those addressing the length of the SA departure, are also likely to be important in explaining why SA rates do not predict sentence lengths. The data analyzed here, however, offer little empirical insight into that area, although the mechanisms available to prosecutors are well known. Prosecutors can offer a lenient plea bargain, manipulate the sentence calculations through sentence factor bargaining,' 6 omit relevant conduct, or agree not to oppose a defendant's motion for a judicial downward departure. Each district reaches its own equilibrium in the use of these devices, influenced by the attitudes of and interactions between the bench and U.S. Attorney's Office, and by each district's historical sentencing patterns.' 7 Although the interplay is different in each district, the overall effect is to blunt the impact of differences in SA rates. The fact that inter-district and nationwide statistics suggest that district to district variations do not result in broad sentence disparities does not address the very real individual inequalities that can arise in particular cases. The impact of an SA departure upon an individual defendant's sentence can be dramatic. The average difference between cooperation and non-cooperation sentences in narcotics trafficking cases is more than five years and as the guideline sentences grow, so do the reduc-tions.
Not every defendant, however, who fails to receive a SA departure ends up with a harsher sentence than those who do. The actual sentence imposed depends on a number of prosecutorial and judicial decisions. While the guidelines constrain the choices available, there remain enough different ways to combine those choices and so influence the ultimate sentence that responsibility for sentencing remains with the people making decisions, rather than with the guideline system itself.
Finally, it bears noting that the Commission's statistics and the guidelines themselves make SA departures more readily identifiable targets for claims of disparity than some other causes. The number of departures is easily reported and discussed. Less visible are other common tools used to influence sentence length, including charging decisions, sentence factor manipulation, prosecutorial sentence recommendations and judicial adjustment of the magnitude of departures. While these are harder to capture and quantify, they are usually just as effective in controlling sentence length as the now ubiquitous but perhaps surprisingly under-determinative 5Ki motion. Islands, the district with the highest rate of cooperation in the nation, because its rate of 85% for 14 cases is completely atypical. There were 3803 cases and 1485 SA departures in those districts. The Commission's statistics probably understate the real use of SA departures. For example, the fifth lowest reported rate of cooperation is in the E.D. Va. Apparently most cooperation in that district is rewarded with a sentence reduction pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P 35(c) which permits the government to request a postsentence reduction for post-sentence cooperation. Although judges in that district will not postpone sentences to permit cooperation to mature, they seem to ignore the requirement that 35(c) reductions account only for post-sentence cooperation. Commission statistics do not include such reductions. If the E.D. Va. were excluded as anomalous (although the practice could be common) and the 11th district (W.D. Ar.) were included, the rate is 7.5% (205 our of 3351 cases). 6Those districts account for 9.3% of all sentences (3806 out of 40,879 total sentences imposed).
Notes

